Which compensation for whom ? by Gastineau, Pascal & Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle
Which compensation for whom ?
Pascal Gastineau, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau
To cite this version:
Pascal Gastineau, Emmanuelle Taugourdeau. Which compensation for whom ?. Documents
de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2012.80 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2012. <halshs-
00768884>
HAL Id: halshs-00768884
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00768884
Submitted on 26 Dec 2012
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which compensation for whom ? 
 
Pascal GASTINEAU, Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU 
 
2012.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-de-travail/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
 
Which compensation for whom?∗
Pascal Gastineau† Emmanuelle Taugourdeau‡
November 2012
∗We thank Vincent Martinet and Gilles Rotillon for their comments and advices on previous drafts
of the paper. We are grateful to the audiences at 14th BIECON, ISEE conference 2012 and GREQAM
seminar for helpful discussions.
†IFSTTAR, Transport and Environment Laboratory, EconomiX, 69675 Bron Cedex - France. Email:
pascal.gastineau@ifsttar.fr
‡CNRS, Paris School of Economics, CES-ENS Cachan, 61 avenue du Président Wilson, 94235 Cachan
Cedex - France. Email: emmanuelle.taugourdeau@ens-cachan.fr. Phone: +33 (0)1 47 40 28 17.
1
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.80
Abstract
This paper examines a situation where a decision-maker determines the appro-
priate compensation that should be implemented for a given ecological damage.
The compensation can be either or both in monetary and environmental units to
meet three goals: i) no aggregate welfare loss, ii) minimization of the cost associated
with the compensation, iii) minimal environmental compensation requirement. The
findings suggest that - in some cases - providing both monetary and environmental
compensation can be the best option. We also emphasize the impact of implement-
ing a minimal environmental compensation constraint especially in terms of equity
and cost efficiency.
JEL codes: H43, Q51, Q57
Keywords: Environmental Damage, Compensation, Welfare, Inequity
Résumé
Cet article détermine la compensation optimale qu’un décideur public doit im-
poser de mettre en place à un pollueur responsable d’un dommage environnemental.
La compensation peut être soit monétaire, soit environnementale, soit une combi-
naison des deux. Elle doit permettre d’atteindre trois objectifs : i) pas de perte de
bien-être agrégée, ii) une minimisation du coût associé à la compensation, iii) une
compensation écologique minimale. Les résultats montrent que - dans certains cas -
une compensation à la fois monétaire et environnementale peut être la meilleure op-
tion. Nous insistons également sur les impacts de la mise en oeuvre d’une contrainte
de compensation écologique minimale notamment en termes d’équité et d’efficacité.
Codes de Classification JEL : H43, Q51, Q57
Mots clefs : Dommage environnemental, Compensation, Bien-être, Inéquité
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1 Introduction
This paper aims to analyze the choice of a policy-maker in charge of determining the
scaling of compensation for accidental environmental damage. As a form of compensa-
tion, the policy-maker may choose between prescribing a uniform amount of money to
each individual and/or restoring a natural resource similar to the damaged one. Given
the properties of the injured population (number of agents and heterogeneity in wealth
or preferences), the policy-maker pursues a trade-off between two conflicting objectives:
equity and efficiency. Here, equity refers to the idea that each agent does not suffer
similarly from the damage and does not benefit similarly from the compensation. As
a result, the pattern of compensation may either reestablish equity (no change in indi-
vidual and aggregate welfare) or maintain a certain level of inequity resulting from the
damage, since agents support any welfare losses whereas others benefit from welfare gain
even if the aggregate welfare remains unchanged. We oppose this equity purpose to an
efficiency one, here defined in terms of costs: an efficient compensation will be the one
which ensures no aggregate welfare change together with a minimum level of costs.
Decision-makers are aware of the need to prevent and to remedy for environmen-
tal damage. This growing environmental awareness was notably embodied in various
statutes such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) in the U.S. and the
Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage in the European Union. These texts highlight the
role that authorities have to play in order to establish a common framework that any
polluter may comply with.
In addition, there is a sharp debate on the best way to offset the damages on natural
resources and services. Generally, two types of compensation are distinguished: environ-
mental compensation and monetary compensation. The first one consists in providing
an environmental restoration or implementing other actions that provide benefit to the
restoration. The second one consists in an amount of money paid to the prejudiced peo-
ple. Within the last couple of years, ecological compensation for the loss of environmental
assets (whether the ecological damage is planned or accidental) gained popularity. More-
over, the resource-to-resource (R-R) or service-to-service (S-S) equivalence approaches
are considered as a first option by the European Directive. Furthermore, this Directive
precludes the use of direct monetary payments to victims.
Non-monetary methods such as equivalency analyses (EA) aim to implement actions
that provide natural resources and/or services of the same type, quality and quantity
as those of damaged ones (i.e. ’in-kind’ compensation) (Dunford et al., 2004; Zafonte
3
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and Hampton, 2007).1 These techniques determine the necessary compensation to off-
set past, current and future damages without directly valuing them in economic terms,
by equalizing the amount of loss and gain of resources and services over time. To do
so, they use a selection of proxies (metrics) representing the most important ecosystem
services (English et al., 2009).2 The presupposed advantages of S-S and R-R methods
(i.e. "no net loss" principle) stand in contrast with drawbacks associated with well-
known monetary valuation techniques. However, none of the methods are perfect and
the reliability of the equivalency methods to measure the environmental damage and/or
scale and to determine the appropriate compensation is under discussion. On the eco-
logical side, while stressing the usefulness of the equivalency methods, Dunford et al.
(2004) also emphasize their weaknesses: a high degree of uncertainty concerning esti-
mates of compensatory restoration and their difficulty to consider complex impacts and
phenomenon. Many attempts are made to improve ecological equivalency methods by
focusing on specific issues: uncertainty (Moilanen et al., 2009), temporal dynamics (Ben-
dor, 2009) or spatial analysis (Bruggeman et al., 2005; Bruggeman et al., 2008).3 On
the economic side, Zafonte and Hampton (2007) suggest that, under certain conditions,
resource equivalency analysis (REA, i.e. R-R) provides an acceptable approximation
of compensating wealth. By contrast, many authors argue that ecological equivalence
specified in biophysical equivalents could fail to provide a satisfactory compensation in
a welfare perspective (Flores and Thacher, 2002). Flores and Thacher (2002) also stress
the potential economic inefficiencies that could occur when the money component is
excluded from the analysis and thus recommend a case by case determination of the
adequate compensation that would better consider distributional issues associated with
compensatory projects.
In this paper, we go further in the analysis of compensation by showing that en-
vironmental and monetary compensations are not antinomic and may be implemented
simultaneously. Due to heterogeneous individual preferences (or income), compensation
can result in some losers and winners relative to their initial (pre-injury or pre-project)
utility. Therefore, careful attention must be paid to the characteristics and the size of the
population affected by an environmental damage when determining the compensation to
implement. Thus, we study how the decision-maker can combine both of them in order
to determine the adequate compensation at minimal cost. Of course, this analysis is only
relevant when an ecological compensation with a similar natural resource or service is
1This option is preferred to ’out-of-kind’ compensation in which the adverse impacts to one resource
(or habitat) are mitigated through the creation, restoration, or enhancement of another resource (or
habitat).
2When equivalency approaches can not be used, valuation scaling approaches (value-to-cost and
value-to-value) are recommended.
3See Quétier and Lavorel (2011) for a synthesis.
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feasible.
In line with Cole (2012), this paper allows us to investigate equity and cost efficiency
issues associated with an enforced ecological compensation. We depart from Cole by
considering equity issues for the prejudiced population instead of considering the society
on its whole. Moreover, contrary to Cole (2012) who compares both compensation
schemes, we allow for a mixed compensation in which both of the compensatory methods
may be implemented at the same time.
To reach our goal, we propose a simple model of an economy with two goods, a
composite good and a natural resource. In this model, we determine which type of com-
pensation the decision-maker may enforce the polluter to implement given the magnitude
of the damage, the number and the characteristics of the prejudiced agents, and the cost
associated with each compensation scheme. Since we do not introduce any incentives in
our model (prevention, mitigation), we focus on accidental or unanticipated damages.
Moreover, our model refers to marginal damages in the sense that they do not alter the
agents’ preferences. For instance, these damages could be either an accidental release
of hazardous-substance into the environment (soil or river) or unanticipated temporary
damages to verges and footpaths due to road building processes. In these cases, ecological
compensation could consist in replanting plants or restoring fish streams. To determine
the optimal compensation scheme, the decision-maker pursues three goals:
• no welfare loss for the whole population impacted by the environmental damage;
• minimization of the cost of the compensation scheme, in line with recommendation
of "reasonable cost" of the European directive 2004/35/EC;
• environmental compensation cannot be less than a given quantity defined by an
EA criterion.
In doing so, the objective of the present paper is in line with the objective of the Eu-
ropean Directive 2004/35/EC, namely "to establish a common framework for the [...]
remedying of environmental damage at a reasonable cost to society". We consider an
heterogeneous population and examine the appropriate compensation for the case of a
log linear utility function. We show that the eligible compensation mechanism (which
meets the three conditions) varies with the magnitude of the environmental impact, the
design of heterogeneity and the number of agents that need compensation. We also show
that enforcing a minimal non-monetary compensation not only implies ecological effects
but also impacts the equity and cost efficiency issues associated with the compensa-
tion. More precisely, when the constraint is binding, an ecological constraint can reduce
inequity at the expense of a rise in cost inefficiency.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Optimal compensa-
tion schemes are derived in Section 3 according to two types of population heterogeneity:
5
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heterogeneity in preferences for goods and heterogeneity in wealth. The last section con-
cludes and suggests future directions for additional work.
2 The Model
We consider a two-period economy composed by n heterogeneous agents in which the
agent i ’s lifetime utility is given by:
Ui = δ
tuit (Xit, qt) with i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, 2
where uit is the agent i ’s utility in period t, δ is the time-preference rate, Xit measures
the agent i’s private consumption and qt the level of the environmental good or service
measured in physical units at time t.
The "lifetime" indirect utility of agent i is given by:
Vi = vi (Wi, q1, q2) (1)
where Wi stands for the agent i’s intertemporal income which is exogenously given.
We assume that the natural resource is accidentally damaged in the first period and
compensated in the second one according to a compensating rule decided by a policy-
maker. The compensation is twofold: a monetary compensation identical for each agent
whatever his type, and an environmental compensation.
Leaving the utility of an individual unchanged following an environmental damage
implies:
dVi =
∂vi
∂Wi
dWi +
∂vi
∂q1
dq1 +
∂vi
∂q2
dq2 = 0 (2)
where dq1 < 0 stands for the accidental damage and dq2 > 0, the environmental com-
pensation while dWi is the monetary compensation.
The individual willingness to accept a monetary compensation for the environmental
damage is defined as:4
WTAWi =
(
∂vi
∂q1
/ ∂vi
∂Wi
)
(−dq1) (3)
It expresses how much money the individual i is willing to accept in exchange for the
loss (dq1).
Using the same reasoning it is possible to express a WTA in terms of environmental
unit:
WTAqi =
(
∂vi
∂q1
/ ∂vi
∂q2
)
(−dq1).
4WTAWi is the value of dWi obtained by equation (2) stating that dq2 = 0. WTA
W
i is identified
with the compensating variation. The absence of environmental damage is the reference state for most
people. WTA is the better measure to use (Knetsch, 2007).
6
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We denote by W =
∑n
i=1 Vi the aggregate welfare of the n victims.
When determining the compensation pattern, the decision-maker aims to account for
three criteria: minimize the costs involved by the implementation of the whole compen-
sation, leave the aggregate welfare unchanged and comply with a minimal environmental
compensation requirement.
The program of the decision-maker writes:
min
MC,dq2
C(dq2,MC) (4)
subject to
dW = 0 (5)
dq2(1 + σ)
−1 ≥ −dq1 (6)
MC ≥ 0 (7)
where MC = dWi ∀i is the monetary compensation, dq2 the environmental compensa-
tion, and C is the cost function associated to the compensation. W stands for the aggre-
gate welfare and constraint (5) characterizes the fact that the compensating policy must
leave the aggregate welfare unchanged. Constraint (6) specifies that the environmental
compensation must at least be equal to a given value larger than the initial damage.
This value corresponds to the one that would be determined when using Equivalence
Approaches (EA) in their simplest formulation, i.e. the "discounted" environmental
gain equalizes the "discounted" environmental loss. In this expression, σ is the discount
rate associated to the EA constraint.5 Note that no ex-post redistribution of monetary
compensation between losers and gainers is feasible.
The Lagrangian associated to this program is given by
L = C (dq2,MC) + λ1 [dW] + λ2
[
dq2
(
1 + σ)−1 + dq1
]
+ λ3 [MC]
where λ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to constraint (5), λ2 to (6) and λ3 to
(7).
The conditions arising from solving the Lagrangian are:
∂L
∂MC
= −
∂C
∂MC
+ λ1
∂dW
∂MC
+ λ3 = 0 (8)
∂L
∂dq2
= −
∂C
∂dq2
+ λ1
∂dW
∂dq2
+ λ2 = 0 (9)
5The determination of the appropriate discount rate is still controversial in the literature. In practice,
a 3 percent rate is recommended for equivalency analysis in the US (NOAA, 1999).
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∂L
∂λ1
= dW =
n∑
i=1
dvi = 0 (10)
∂L
∂λ2
= dq2(1 + σ)
−1 + dq1 ≥ 0 (11)
∂L
∂λ3
= MC ≥ 0 (12)
Four regimes can be distinguished from this program, that determine the pattern of
the compensation:
• regime 1: (monetary compensation [R1]) : λ2 > 0;λ3 = 0 => dq2 = −dq1(1 +
σ);MC > 0. In this case both compensations are implemented but the level of the
environmental compensation being the minimal one defined by the EA constraint,
we call this case "monetary compensation". Without the EA constraint, the envi-
ronmental compensation would be between 0 and −dq1(1 + σ). This case leads to
the relation [
∂dW
∂MC
/∂dW
∂dq2
]
>
[
∂C
∂MC
/ ∂C
∂dq2
]
(13)
One unit spent on monetary compensation generates more welfare than one unit
spent on environmental compensation. Then the decision-maker should favor mon-
etary compensation in order to compensate at minimal cost.
• regime 2: (mixed compensation [R2]): λ2 = λ3 = 0 => dq2 > −dq1(1 + σ);MC >
0. There exists a couple of compensation tools (MC∗, dq∗2) such that:[
∂dW
∂MC
/∂dW
∂dq2
]
=
[
∂C
∂MC
/ ∂C
∂dq2
]
(14)
The ratio of the marginal differences in utility equals the ratio of the marginal
costs. In other words, there exists a couple (MC∗, dq∗2) such that the welfare that
we get from an additional unit of MC or dq2 per fund spent is the same.
• regime 3: (environmental compensation [R3]): λ2 = 0;λ3 > 0 => dq2 > −dq1(1 +
σ);MC = 0, which implies[
∂dW
∂MC
/∂dW
∂dq2
]
<
[
∂C
∂MC
/ ∂C
∂dq2
]
(15)
This is the opposite case to regime 1. The decision-maker should promote envi-
ronmental compensation.
8
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• regime 4: (minimal compensation [R4]) λ2 > 0;λ3 > 0 => dq2 = −dq1(1 +
σ);MC = 0 For λ2 > 1 and λ3 > 0 there is no optimal solution. There is a ’second
best’ solution such that there is no monetary compensation and minimal environ-
mental compensation. For R4, dW > 0. This regime does not fulfill constraint
(5).
3 Application
We now specify both the cost and the utility functions. We assume a log linear utility
function of the form
Uit = αi lnXit + (1− αi) ln qt
where αi is the agent i
′s weight for the consumption bundle in utility.
The agent i’s lifetime utility function rewrites:
Ui = αi lnX1i + (1− αi) ln q1 + δαi lnX2i + δ(1 − αi) ln q2
Assuming that agents can lend in a perfect capital market, the intertemporal budget
constraint writes Wi = Xi1 (1 + r) + Xi2 where r is the interest rate. The arbitrage
in private consumption between period 1 and 2 gives the relation between both private
consumptions X2i
X1i
= δi (1 + r) that combined with the intertemporal budget constraint
gives the demand for private goods so that the indirect utility writes
Vi = αi ln
(
Wi
(1 + δ) (1 + r)
)
+ (1−αi) ln q1+ δαi ln
(
δ
(1 + δ)
Wi
)
+ δ(1−αi) ln q2 (16)
Finally, we assume that the cost function for compensation is given by:
C (dq2,MC) = nMC + a (dq2)
b
The cost of compensation is decomposed in two parts: a lump sum part (nMC)
which characterizes the monetary compensation granted uniformly to all agents, and a
second part which is proportional to the restoration and depends on the type of the
nature that should be restored (b > 0 can be either ≥ 1 or < 1 ). Note that with the cost
function we use, it is straightforward that the program is quasiconvex in MC, whereas
it is quasiconvex in dq2 for b > 1.
9
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3.1 Heterogeneity in preference for goods
3.1.1 Optimal compensation scheme
We assume that agents are only differentiated by their preference for goods, αi. The
aggregate welfare function writes:
W =W
[
v1(W, q1, q2), . . . , vn(W, q1, q2)
]
It can be rewritten as
W =
n∑
i=1
vi(W, q1, q2)
= nα ln
(
W
(1 + δ) (1 + r)
)
+ n(1− α) ln q1 + nδα ln
(
δ
(1 + δ)
W
)
+ nδ(1− α) ln q2
where α = 1
n
∑
αi is the mean preference for the private good.
Condition (5) becomes
dW = (1 + δ)
nα
W
MC +
n(1− α)
q1
dq1 + nδ
(1− α)
q2
dq2 = 0 (17)
so that
MC = W
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
(
−dq1
q1
−
δ
q2
dq2
)
(18)
or
dq2 =
(
−dq1
q1
−MC
α(1 + δ)
(1− α)W
)
q2
δ
(19)
Given this relation between both compensations, we are able to distinguish two dif-
ferent cases according to the value of b: b ≥ 1 or b < 1.
Proposition 1 For b ≥ 1 four solutions can emerge from the program of the decision-
maker
1. dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) and MC = −dq1W
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
(
1
q1
− δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
iff n < n and
(1 + σ) < q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 1)
with
n = ab
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)W
q2 (− (1 + σ) dq1)
b−1
δ
2. dq2 =
(
(1−α)nWδ
α(1+δ)q2ab
) 1
b−1
and MC =
(1−α)W
(
−dq1
q1
)
(1+δ)α −
(
δ(1−α)W
q2(1+δ)α
) b
b−1 ( n
ab
) 1
b−1 iff n >
n > n (regime 2)
with
n = ab
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)W
(q2
δ
)b(
−
dq1
q1
)b−1
10
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3. MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 iff n > n and (1 + σ) <
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 3)
4. MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) iff (1 + σ) >
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 highlights the four different regimes of compensation scheme for b ≥ 1.
Regime 4 is the one which corresponds to the seminal EA compensation. Without
EA constraint, condition (6) does not hold and regime 4 does not exist anymore. In this
regime, the marginal rate of substitution between the environmental good in period 1
and 2
(
∂vi
∂q1
/ ∂vi
∂q2
= q2
q1
1
δ
)
is low so that a very low level of dq2 is required to compensate
the loss of one unit of q1. In this regime, the minimum compensation MC = 0 and
dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) is then higher that the required one. Due to the constraint, this
scheme of compensation does not fulfill the welfare condition since it implies a higher
level of aggregate welfare than required i.e. d
∑
Vi > 0. The occurrence of this regime
crucially depends on the discount rate in the EA constraint. Especially, if we consider
that the discount rate σ equals the time preference rate (δ = 11+σ ) then this regime
applies as soon as q2 < q1 which seems to be consistent in case of a damage in period 1.
The three other regimes check the welfare condition. They occur when the discount
rate is relatively high compared to the marginal rate of substitution between the environ-
mental good in period 1 and 2
(
q2
q1
1
δ
> (1 + σ)
)
. The compensation schemes (regime 1, 2
or 3) depend on the number of victims. The explanation lies in the cost function and the
nature of the goods which characterizes the properties of both types of compensation:
the monetary compensation is granted uniformly to all victims so that the cost of such
compensation is linearly increasing with the number of agents. Conversely, the amount
of environmental compensation is fixed whatever the number of agents it benefits, so
that its cost is stable with n. Intuitively, it is more relevant to implement a monetary
compensation for a low level of n and an environmental compensation for a high level of
n.
As Figure 1 shows, for a low n (n < n) [regime 1], the best compensation scheme
is that which implements the minimum level required of environmental compensation
together with the value of the monetary compensation that leaves the aggregate welfare
unchanged.6 The level of MC is fixed whatever the level of n ∈ [0, n[. This is due to
the EA constraint that implies a higher environmental compensation than the level that
would be optimal without any constraint. For n ≥ n, the EA constraint plays no role as
dq2 ≥ −dq1(1 + σ). The value of n increases with α and (−dq1) and decreases with W
6The following parameter set was used for numerical simulation: (W = 372000, α = 0.8, δ = 0.67,
q1 = 10000, q2 = 10000, dq1 = −200, a = 300, b = 1.75, σ = 0.34). Natural resource recovery is achieved
in one period, i.e. q1 = q2, each period lasting 10 years. dq1 depicts a temporary loss.
11
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and δ. An agent who values more the future expects a higher level of compensation so
that the switch from regime 1 to regime 2 occurs for a lower n. Conversely a lower weight
for the environmental good in the utility (high α) implies a lower need for compensation
and the limit between both regimes is shifted for a higher n. Finally, a higher damage
directly increases the EA constraint and consequently shifts the limit for a higher n.
0
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0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000
0
50
100
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200
250
300
n
MC( ) dq2( )
R3R2R1
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Figure 1: Optimal Compensation Scheme as a function of the population size
When n ∈ [n, n[ [regime 2], the EA constraint is still not bound and the level of dq2
increases with n. This implies a corresponding decrease of the monetary compensation
since MC weighs more and more relatively to dq2 in the cost function. This trend
lasts until it is no longer useful to use any monetary compensation that has become too
heavy in the cost function. In the last regime (n > n) [regime 3], the environmental
compensation is the only compensating tool that is used to leave the society’s welfare
unchanged. For the same reasons as the value of n, n increases with α and (−dq1), and
decreases with W and δ.
For regime 2 which implies the use of both types of compensation (n ∈ [n, n[), the
comparative static analysis gives the following relations:7
∂ (dq2)
∂α
< 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂W
> 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂δ
> 0;
∂(dq2)
∂(−dq1)
= 0
and
∂MC
∂(−dq1)
> 0;
∂MC
∂δ
< 0;
∂MC
∂α
> 0
∂MC
∂W
< 0
}
⇐⇒ n > n
(
b− 1
b
)b−1
7See Appendix B.
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The compensation scheme is obtained by equating the ratio of the marginal variations
of utilities
(
∂W
∂MC
/ ∂W
∂dq2
= (1+δ)αq2
Wδ(1−α)
)
to the ratio of the marginal costs
(
∂C
∂MC
/ ∂C
∂dq2
= n
ab(dq2)
b−1
)
.
Note that none of the ratios are affected by a change in MC while an increase of dq2
decreases the ratio of the marginal costs.
The impact of the environmental damage (−dq1) on the monetary compensation is
obviously positive. A higher damage implies a higher compensation. Nevertheless, it
is surprisingly null on the environmental compensation. Indeed, the intuitive positive
effect of (−dq1) on dq2 is offset by the trade-off effect between MC and dq2. Why does
this trade-off effect not impact MC? The explanation comes from the cost function.
The marginal cost of compensation with respect to MC is constant and equal to n
whatever the level of MC while the marginal cost of compensation with respect to dq2
is increasing with dq2. Following a rise in (−dq1) the higher level of dq2 due to the
environmental willingness to accept increases the weight of dq2 in the cost function and
implies a trade-off in favor of MC which diminishes the required level of dq2. As a
result, following an increase of (−dq1), the monetary compensation increases and the
environmental compensation remains unchanged.8 Note that in regime 3, when MC is
reduced to zero, since there is no trade-off between both types of compensation, the level
of dq2 is positively linked to the environmental damage.
The impact of wealth on compensation is twofold. On the one hand, the intertemporal
wealth impacts negatively the ratio of the marginal variation of utilities while it does not
affect the ratio of the marginal costs. Maintaining both ratios equal implies that a higher
level of wealth induces a higher environmental compensation. On the other hand, the
level of wealth impacts the monetary compensation through two channels. The direct
effect can be deduced from the willingness to accept derived from Equation (17) with
dq2 = 0. A richer agent is inclined to require a higher amount of MC to compensate the
environmental damage than a poor agent.9 The indirect effect comes from the trade-off
between both compensations. A rise in dq2 tends to diminish the level of MC and this
decrease is stronger with a higher W . Since the intertemporal wealth has a positive
effect on dq2, this indirect effect is negative on MC. The whole effect on MC depends
on which effect dominates. The negative direct effect wins for a sufficiently high number
of agents. As we have shown, a rise in n modifies the compensation scheme in favor of
dq2 with respect to MC while it does not modify the willingness to accept. A higher
weight of dq2 leads to a direct effect on MC dominated by the indirect effect through
dq2. The whole impact of wealth on MC is then negative.
The impact of the time preference is less ambiguous. The equalization of the ratios
8The offset of both effects on dq2 comes from the specification of both the utility function and the
cost function.
9The impact of −dq1 on MC is given by the relation
dMC
(−dq1)
= (1−α)W
(1+δ)αq1
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links positively δ with dq2: the more the second period is valued in the utility, the higher
is the level of required environmental compensation. The effect of δ on MC is also
unambiguously negative. The direct effect through the willingness to accept is negative:
the valuation of the damage in period one is lower with a higher δ so that the required
monetary compensation is lower. In addition, the positive effect of δ on dq2 impacts
negatively the monetary compensation.
The mean preference for the private good (α) is negatively linked to dq2 in the equal-
ity of the marginal utilities ratio to the marginal costs ratio. The lower the weight of the
environmental good in the utility (high α), the lower the effect of environmental damage
on the utility and the lower the required environmental compensation. Similarly to the
impact of wealth, there are two effects of opposite sign of the monetary compensation.
The direct effect is negative while the effect through dq2 is positive. Again, the whole
effect depends on the value of n. A high level of n implies a high weight of dq2 and the
positive effect through dq2 dominates the direct negative effect.
Let us now look at the optimal compensation without any EA constraint. In this
case, regimes 1 and 4 disappear and only regimes 2 and 3 remain. Under regime 2, the
compensation scheme leads to an increasing level of dq2 and a decreasing level of MC as
stressed by Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Compensation scheme without EA constraint (CS0)
Under both regimes dq2 > 0 whatever the value of n. Nevertheless the level of envi-
ronmental compensation is very low (dq2 ≈ 0) for small n.
14
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As mentioned in the proof of the previous proposition, when b < 1, the cost function
is concave which implies that the compensation which is implemented is a corner solution
of the problem of cost minimization.
Proposition 2 For b < 1, three solutions can emerge from the program of the decision-
maker
1. dq2 = −dq1(1+σ) and MC = −dq1W
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
(
1
q1
− δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
iff (1+σ) < q2
q1
1
δ
and
n < n̂ (regime 1)
with n̂ =
a(−dq1)
b−1
((
q2
q1
1
δ
)b
−(1+σ)b
)
W
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
δ
q2
(
q2
q1
1
δ
−(1+σ)
)
2. MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 iff (1 + σ) <
q2
q1
1
δ
and n > n̂ (regime 3)
3. MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) iff (1 + σ) >
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 4)
Proof. See Appendix C.
With b < 1 the limit between regime 1 and 3 is given by n̂. As previously explained,
a higher (resp. lower) level of n goes in favor of the use of environmental (resp. mone-
tary) compensation. Contrary to the case with b > 1, there is no more optimal mixed
compensation and regime 1 switches directly to regime 3 with the increase in n since
only corner solutions enable to minimize the cost.
3.1.2 Cost and welfare analyses
In this section, we investigate the cost associated with alternative compensation schemes
and their welfare implications. We concentrate on cases where b > 1. First recall that for
a slightly high discount rate, the compensation scheme reduces to regime 4 (no monetary
compensation and a minimal environmental compensation driven by the EA constraint
whatever the level of n). The change of the aggregate welfare is positive as well as
every individual welfare variation.10 The agent that values the environmental good the
most (lowest αi) wins the most. We denote this compensation scheme by CSEA and
the optimal Compensation Scheme given by Proposition 1 by CS∗. We also denote by
CS0 the scheme that combines monetary and environmental compensation without EA
constraint. As already seen, the compensation scheme (CS0) is composed of two regimes
characterized by:
• dq2 =
(
(1−α)nWδ
α(1+δ)q2ab
) 1
b−1
and MC =
(1−α)W
(
−dq1
q1
)
(1+δ)α −
(
δ(1−α)W
q2(1+δ)α
) b
b−1 ( n
ab
) 1
b−1 iff n > n
(regime 2)
10dVi = (1− αi)dq1
[
−
1
q1
+ δ
q2
(1 + σ)
]
> 0 ∀i under regime 4.
15
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• MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 iff n > n (regime 3)
Finally, we introduce two other compensation schemes that could be referred as
benchmark cases: Full environmental compensation (CSFenv) and Full monetary com-
pensation (CSFmon). They are defined as follows:
• (CSFenv): dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 and MC = 0
• (CSFmon): MC = W
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
(
−dq1
q1
)
and dq2 = 0
Note that CSFenv and CSFmon are fixed and do not vary with n.
Figure 3 shows the costs associated with these compensation schemes (CS0, CSFenv,
CSFmon) and with CS
∗ (composed of regimes 1, 2 and 3).11 From a cost minimization
perspective, we observe that for n < n the compensation scheme described by regime 1
(thick line) is not the least costly possible option. The EA constraint imposes an addi-
tional cost. Without this constraint, there would exist two better options: Full monetary
compensation (dashed line) for n < (n/b) and monetary compensation associated with
environmental compensation at a level lower than (−dq1)(1+σ) (dotted line) for n < n.
12
For n ≥ n, CS∗ is the less costly option (jointly with CS0 for n ≤ n ≤ n and with CS0
and CSFenv for n ≥ n).
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Figure 3: Costs associated with the four compensation schemes when 1 + σ < q2
q1
1
δ
If either regimes 1, 2 and 3 leave the aggregate welfare unchanged, it is not true for
individual ones. As shown in Figures 4.a and 4.b, compensation may result in losers and
11Due to Proposition 1, this comment applies only for discount rates that ensure (1 + σ) < q2
q1
1
δ
12The threshold n/b results from the equalization of costs associated with the CSFmon scheme and
the CS∗ scheme.
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winners. This inequity is reduced as the share of the environmental compensation grows
(regime 2).
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(a) αi = 0.9 (winner) (b) αi = 0.5 (loser)
Figure 4: Individual welfare gain/loss for two different levels of αi when 1 + σ <
q2
q1
1
δ
When expressed - totally or partially - in monetary terms, necessary compensation
has to be large for people who value money the less (low αi) (Brekke, 1997). Under
regimes 1 and 2, individuals with αi = α do not support any individual welfare variations
whereas individuals with αi < α incur a loss of welfare decreasing with αi and n and
individuals with a αi > α benefit from a gain of welfare (see appendix D). This gain
increases with αi and decreases with n (Figure 4.a).
Both cost and welfare analyses highlight that regime 1 is worth in terms of cost
compared to a compensation scheme without EA constraint (CS0) but better in terms of
equity. As suggested by figures 4.a and 4.b, when the EA constraint applies, it limits the
gains for the winners but also the losses for the losers. In the trade-off between efficiency
and equity, the EA constraint diminishes the cost efficiency of the compensation but also
lowers inequity between agents. In that context, while the primary justification of the
EA constraint is based on environmental criteria, it may also be supported for equity
purposes. Figures 4.a and 4.b also show that the monetary compensation (CSFmon) is
the worst in terms of equity compared to the other compensation schemes.
Finally, under regime 3 where the only compensation is the environmental one, every
individual welfare loss from the damage is offset by the environmental compensation.
For this regime, the compensation granted to all individuals corresponds to a pure in-
tertemporal compensation with a good similar to the damaged one. WTAqi does not
vary with n and is similar for all individuals, i.e. WTAqi =
−dq1
q1
q2
δ
= dq2 ∀i. From a
welfare perspective, a Full environmental compensation is the most appropriate solution
since there are no welfare losses at aggregate and individual levels. Nevertheless, Figure
3 shows that for a low n the cost of the Full environmental compensation is definitely
higher than the cost associated with other compensation schemes.
17
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.80
When agents highly weigh the gains associated to the future environmental good
respectively to the gains associated to the present environmental good (high σ), regime
4 applies. The implemented environmental compensation (resulting from the EA con-
straint) is higher than the one which would leave the aggregate welfare unchanged. As
a result, cost associated to this regime is constant and higher than cost associated to
the other schemes except for the pure monetary compensation with a high number of
victims (Figure 5).13
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Figure 5: Costs associated with the four compensation schemes when 1 + σ > q2
q1
1
δ
Under regime 4, whatever the level of αi, agents win from compensation (except for
αi = 1). In addition, the agents who value more the environmental goods win more, as
shown in Figure 6.14
To sum up, a EA constraint avoids any loser that would exist under all the other
regimes, but at the expense of high costs.
13For the numerical simulation the new value of σ is 0.62.
14See Appendix D.
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3.2 Heterogeneity in wealth
In this section, we assume that agents are differentiated according to their wealth, Wi.
The aggregate welfare function writes:
W =W
[
v(W1, q1, q2), . . . , v(Wn, q1, q2)
]
and can be rewritten as:
W =
n∑
i=1
v(Wi, q1, q2)
= α
n∑
i=1
ln
(
Wi
(1 + δ) (1 + r)
)
+ n(1− α) ln q1 + δα
n∑
i=1
ln
(
δ
Wi
(1 + δ)
)
+ nδ(1− α) ln q2
Condition (5) becomes:
dW = d
n∑
i=1
Vi =
α (1 + δ)
W
MC
n∑
i=1
W
Wi
+
n(1− α)
q1
dq1 + nδ
(1 − α)
q2
dq2 = 0 (20)
where W =
∑n
i=1Wi
n
, so that
dq2 =
(
−dq1
q1
−MC
α(1 + δ)
(1− α)W
1
n
n∑
i=1
W
Wi
)
q2
δ
and
MC =
1
1
n
∑n
i=1
W
Wi
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
(
−dq1
q1
−
δ
q2
dq2
)
W
where 1
n
∑n
i=1
W
Wi
= IW ≥ 1 is a measure of the average wealth inequality in the society.
An increase in IW implies a greater wealth inequality in the society (IW = 1 means no inequality).
15
15When considering the special case where dq2 = 0, in analogy with Medin et al. (2001), MC
corresponds to the per person ’benefit’ when equal marginal utility of the environmental good is assumed.
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Similarly to the heterogeneous preferences case, we distinguish two different cases
according to the value of b with respect to 1.
Proposition 3 For b ≥ 1, four solutions can emerge from the program of the decision-
maker
1. dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) and MC = (−dq1)
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
W
IW
(
1
q1
− δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
iff n < n and
(1 + σ) < q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 1)
with
n =
α
(1− α)
(1 + δ)
δ
q2ab
IW
W
((1 + σ) (−dq1))
b−1
2. dq2 =
[
n(1−α)δ
abα(1+δ)q2
W
IW
] 1
b−1
and MC = (1−α)
α(1+δ)
W
IW
−dq1
q1
−
(
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
W
IW
δ
q2
) b
b−1 [ n
ab
] 1
b−1 iff
n > n > n (regime 2)
with
n = ab
(
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)
IW
W
)(q2
δ
)b(−dq1
q1
)b−1
3. MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 iff n > n and (1 + σ) <
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 3)
4. MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) iff (1 + σ) >
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 4)
Proof. Similar to Proof of Proposition 1 where conditions (6) and (7) imply:
dq2 > −dq1(1 + σ)⇐⇒ n >
α
(1− α)
(1 + δ)
δ
q2ab
IW
W
((1 + σ) (−dq1))
b−1 = n
MC > 0⇐⇒ n < ab
(
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)
IW
W
)(q2
δ
)b(−dq1
q1
)b−1
= n
both conditions can be fulfilled iff
n > n⇐⇒
q1
q2
<
1
δ (1 + σ)

The comments about each regime are quite similar to those for heterogeneous pref-
erences. Here we concentrate on the distinctions between both cases. The values of MC
and dq2 show that the heterogeneity in wealth introduces the expression W/IW instead
It is defined byMC = n∑
n
n=1
(
∂v
∂Wi
/
∂v
∂q1
) (−dq1). If equal marginal utility of income is assumed (i.e IW = 1
in our case), then we have MC = 1
n
∑n
n=1
(
∂v
∂q1
/
∂v
∂Wi
)
(−dq1) =
1
n
∑n
n=1WTA
W
i .
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of W with no heterogeneity. This expression highlights two different elements in the
wealth heterogeneity: the value of the average wealth (how rich the society is), and the
distribution effect (how unequal the society is).
The comparative static analysis for regime 2 gives the following relations:16
∂ (dq2)
∂(−dq1)
= 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂α
< 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂W
> 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂δ
> 0;
∂ (dq2)
∂IW
< 0
and
∂MC
∂(−dq1)
> 0;
∂MC
∂δ
< 0;
∂MC
∂α
> 0
∂MC
∂W
< 0
∂MC
∂IW
> 0
⇐⇒ n > n
(
b− 1
b
)b−1
The impacts of (−dq1) and δ are similar to the case with heterogeneity in preferences,
even for α, instead of α. Here the impact of W can be compared to the impact of W
in the previous case. A richer society is inclined to require a higher amount of MC to
compensate the environmental damage than a poor society, but the trade-off between
both compensations implies that for a sufficiently high level of n, the indirect effect from
dq2 on MC dominates and the whole impact of the average wealth on n is positive. The
impact of IW is of opposite sign. An increase in IW implies a higher income inequality in
the population.17 On one hand, since poorer agents value more a monetary compensation
(Vi is concave in Wi), a lower monetary compensation is required for any IW > 1 than
when there is no inequality in wealth (IW = 1). On the other hand, the environmental
compensation is identically valued whatever the level of wealth of the agents (income
inequality plays no role). As a result, the frontiers which separate regime 1 and 2 and
regime 2 and 3 are shifted for higher levels of n and the scales for which regime 1 and
2 apply become larger. Conversely, since n increases with IW , the scale of regime 3 is
reduced since environmental compensation is not increasingly valued by poor people.
As already stressed in the previous subsection, monetary compensation will be in
favor of individuals that value money the most. As shown in Figure 7.a the poorest
individuals (Wi < W/IW ) are the winners.
18 Under regime 4, every individual wins from
the minimal environmental compensation. In addition, the gain from the environmental
compensation is the same for each individual whatever his wealth. Indeed, heterogeneity
only impacts the welfare through the monetary compensation which is here null.
16See Appendix E.
17A rise in IW is here defined as a mean preserving spread in the sense that the ratio IW rises but the
mean wealth remains unchanged, so that wealth inequality clearly increases in the population.
18The following parameter set was used for numerical simulation: (W = 400000, IW = 1.5, α = 0.8,
δ = 0.67, q1 = 10000, q2 = 10000, dq1 = −200, a = 300, b = 1.75, σ = 0.34).
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Figure 7: Individual welfare gain/loss for two different levels of Wi
Proposition 4 For b < 1, three solutions can emerge from the program of the decision-
maker
1. dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) and MC = (−dq1)
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
W
IW
(
1
q1
− δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
iff (1 + σ) < q2
q1
1
δ
and n < n˜ (regime 1)
2. MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 iff (1 + σ) <
q2
q1
1
δ
and n > n˜ (regime 3)
3. MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ) iff (1 + σ) >
q2
q1
1
δ
(regime 4)
with n˜ =
a(−dq1)
b−1
((
q2
q1
1
δ
)b
−(1+σ)
)
IWW
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
δ
q2
(
q2
q1
1
δ
−(1+σ)
)
Proof. Similar to Proposition 1 with the comparison of cases 2 and 3 that yields:
C˜3 < C˜1 ⇐⇒ n >
W
IW
a (−dq1)
b−1
((
q2
q1
1
δ
)b
− (1 + σ)
)
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
δ
q2
(
q2
q1
1
δ
− (1 + σ)
) = n˜

For b < 1, the level of n separating both regimes 1 and 3, i.e. n˜, decreases with IW .
Then heterogeneity in wealth goes in favor of an environmental compensation since the
borders of this regime are extended.
4 Concluding remarks
While the European Directive 2004/35/EC precludes the use of monetary compensation
in response to an environmental damage, this article reintroduces the monetary compen-
sation as a potential compensating tool complementing an environmental compensation.
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We explore which satisfactory compensation can be provided at a minimal cost under
an ecological constraint (here EA constraint). The results feature that the best way to
provide compensation for ecological damage at a minimal cost may be sensitive to several
parameters: nature of heterogeneity, number of victims, relative costs of monetary and
environmental compensations.
More precisely, we show that when the population affected by the environmental
damage is small, the equivalency constraint implies the use of a minimal natural resource
quantity that would not be provided without this constraint for cost reason. But this
constraint enables to diminish the inequity generated by the environmental damage on
the heterogeneous population. Although the main purpose of enforcing an ecological
constraint is an environmental one (i.e. "no net loss" principle) it also has welfare and
cost implications. In that sense, a key result of our paper is to find the optimal balance
between equity and cost efficiency considerations.
However, to go further, some results of our paper may be linked to prevention issues.
For instance, we show that a poor population (low mean income) values more the mon-
etary compensation than a rich and as a consequence, accepts a lower level of money to
compensate the damage it supports. This mechanism extends the use of monetary com-
pensation. Moreover, if this poor affected population is relatively small, the polluter can
consider that the cost of compensation it should support in case of damage is sufficiently
low to not undertake any prevention measure that could avoid any environmental dam-
age. Facing this kind of possible behaviors, the use of a minimal ecological constraint is
strongly justified to avoid them.
Moreover, as shown in this paper, the use or not of an ecological constraint cru-
cially modifies the optimal compensation scheme. Without such a constraint, a mixed
compensation is desirable for a relatively small population of victims. Finally, as often
mentioned in the literature devoted to the Equivalency Analysis, the choice of the value
attributed to the discount rate is determinant for the determination of the optimal com-
pensation. According to this value, the compensation can be either the one resulting
from the Equivalent Analysis method or a more complex one depending on the number
of victims.
Work still remains to be done to get a better understanding of all the implications of
providing compensation for an environmental damage. In particular, a better considera-
tion of natural resource dynamics as well as a deeper study of redistributive effects of the
trade-off between money and nature should be considered in a next step. Heterogeneous
discount rates would be another interesting question.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Rewriting the cost function in dq2 according to (18) gives
C (dq2,MC) = nW
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
(
−dq1
q1
−
δ
q2
dq2
)
+ a (dq2)
b
which is clearly quasi-convex in dq2 if and only if b ≥ 1. Minimizing this cost function
gives
dq2 =
(
(1− α)nWδ
α(1 + δ)q2ab
) 1
b−1
and condition (7) gives the value for MC
MC =
(1− α)W
(
−dq1
q1
)
(1 + δ)α
−
(
δ(1 − α)W
q2 (1 + δ)α
) b
b−1 ( n
ab
) 1
b−1
Conditions (6) and (7) imply
dq2 > − (1 + σ) dq1 ⇐⇒ n > ab
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)W
q2 (− (1 + σ) dq1)
b−1
δ
= n
MC > 0⇐⇒ n < ab
(
(1 + δ)α
(1− α)W
)(q2
δ
)b(−dq1
q1
)b−1
= n
both conditions will be fulfilled iff
n > n⇐⇒ (1 + σ) <
(
q2
q1
1
δ
)
for b ≥ 1
• If n > n > n then MC = 0 and dq2 is derived from (19). It corresponds to
condition (13).
• If n < n < n then dq2 is implemented at its minimal level i.e. dq2 = − (1 + σ) dq1
and MC is derived from (18). It corresponds to condition (15).
• If (1 + σ) >
(
q2
q1
1
δ
)
, which implies n > n, none of condition (6) and (7) are fulfilled
so that both compensations are implemented at their minimal level whatever the
level of n, i.e. MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1(1 + σ).
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B. Comparative statics for heterogeneity in preferences
∂MC
∂α
=
(
−
1
α2
)(
(−dq1)W
(1 + δ) q1
−
b
b− 1
(
δW
q2 (1 + δ)
) b
b−1
(
(1− α)
α
) 1
b−1 ( n
ab
) 1
b−1
)
∂MC
∂α
> 0⇐⇒
α (1 + δ)
W (1− α)
(
(−dq1)
q1
)b−1 (q2
δ
)b((b− 1)
b
)b−1
ab < n
⇐⇒ n
(
b− 1
b
)b−1
< n
∂MC
∂W
=
(1−α)
q1
(−dq1)
(1 + δ)α
−
b
b− 1
W δ (1−α)q2
(1 + δ)α
 bb−1 1
W
( n
ab
) 1
b−1
∂MC
∂W
> 0⇐⇒
(1 + δ)α
W (1− α)
(
(−dq1)
q1
)b−1 (q2
δ
)b(b− 1
b
)b−1
ab > n
⇐⇒ n
(
b− 1
b
)b−1
> n
∂MC
∂δ
= −
(1−α)
q1
(−dq1)
(1 + δ)2 α
W
−
b
b− 1
 n
ab
δ (1−α)
q2
(1 + δ) α
W
 1b−1 (1−α)q2
α
W
δ
(1 + δ)2
< 0
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting the cost function in MC according to (18) gives
C (dq2,MC) = nMC + a
((
−dq1
q1
−MC
α(1 + δ)
(1− α)W
)
q2
δ
)b
which is clearly quasi-convex in dq2 if and only if b ≥ 1. For b < 1, minimizing the
cost leads to set MC = 0 (condition (7)). The value of dq2 is then derived from (19)
which corresponds to regime 3 if the parameters are such that dq2 > −dq1 (1 + σ) for
dq2 =
−dq1
q1
q2
δ
and to regime 4 otherwise.
Rewriting the cost function in dq2 according to (18) gives
C (dq2,MC (dq2)) = nW
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
(
−dq1
q1
−
δ
q2
dq2
)
+ a (dq2)
b
which is clearly quasi-convex in dq2 if and only if b ≥ 1. For b < 1, the cost function
is convex in dq2 so that the only solution which minimizes the cost is a corner solution.
According to condition (6) minimizing the cost requires dq2 = −dq1(1+σ). The value of
MC is derived from (18), which corresponds to regime 1 if the parameters are such that
MC > 0 for MC = −dq1W
(1−α)
α(1+δ)
(
1
q1
− δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
and to regime 4 otherwise.
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We now compare regime 1 and regime 3.
Under regime 3, the cost reduces to
C3 (dq2,MC) = a
(
−dq1
q1
q2
δ
)b
whereas under regime 1, the cost reduces to
C1 (dq2,MC) = n (−dq1)W
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
(
1
q1
−
δ
q2
(1 + σ)
)
+ a (−(1 + σ)dq1)
b
C3 < C1 ⇐⇒ n >
q2α(1 + δ)a (−dq1)
b−1
((
q2
q1
1
δ
)b
− (1 + σ)b
)
W (1− α)δ
(
q2
q1
1
δ
− (1 + σ)
) = n̂
D. Individual welfare losses/gains with respect to αi.
For agent i
dVi = (1 + δ)
αi
W
MC +
(1− αi)
q1
dq1 + δ
(1− αi)
q2
dq2
and the variation of welfare with respect to αi is given by:
∂dVi
∂αi
= (1 + δ)
MC
W
−
dq1
q1
− δ
dq2
q2
> 0
• Under regime 2, replacing MC by it expression (19) gives
∂dVi
∂αi
=
(
1
α
)(
−
dq1
q1
− δ
dq2
q2
)
> 0 from (20) since MC > 0
Since dVi = 0 for αi = α, then dVi > 0 (resp. < 0) for any αi < α (resp. αi > α)
• Under Regime 3, MC = 0 and dq2 = −
q2
q1
1
δ
dq1 such that
∂dVi
∂αi
= −
dq1
q1
+
dq1
q1
= 0
• Under Regime 4, MC = 0 and dq2 = −dq1 (1 + σ) so that
∂dVi
∂αi
= dq1
(
−
1
q1
+
1
q2
(1 + σ)
δ
)
< 0 since (1 + σ) >
q2
q1
1
δ
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E. Comparative statics for heterogeneity in wealth
∂dq2
∂α
= −
1
α2
1
b− 1
(
1− α
α
) 2−b
b−1
[
nδIW
ab(1 + δ)q2
] 1
b−1
< 0
∂dq2
∂δ
=
1
(1 + δ)2
1
b− 1
(
δ
1 + δ
) 2−b
b−1
[
n(1− α)IW
abαq2
] 1
b−1
> 0
∂dq2
∂n
= 2
1
b− 1
1
n
[
n(1− α)IW
abα(1 + δ)q2
] 1
b−1
> 0
∂MC
∂n
=
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
IWW
− δ
q2
1
b− 1
1
n
[
n(1− α)δ
abα(1 + δ)q2
W
IW
] 1
b−1
 < 0
∂MC
∂α
= (−
1
α2
)
(−dq1)
q1
−
b
b− 1
(
1− α
α
)
1
b−1
δ
q2
(
nδ
ab(1 + δ)q2
W
IW
) 1
b−1

∂MC
∂α
> 0⇔
(−dq1)
q1
<
b
b− 1
(
1− α
α
)
1
b−1
δ
q2
(
nδ
ab(1 + δ)q2
W
IW
) 1
b−1
⇐⇒ n >
(
b− 1
b
) b−1
2
n
∂MC
∂IW
= −
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
W
I2W
 1
q1
(−dq1)−
δ
q2
[
n(1− α)δ
abα(1 + δ)q2
W
IW
] 1
b−1
(
b
b− 1
) > 0
⇐⇒ n >
(
b− 1
b
) b−1
2
n
∂MC
∂W
=
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
IW
(
1
q1
(−dq1)−
δ
q2
[
n(1− α)δ
abα(1 + δ)q2
IWW
] 1
b−1
(
b
b− 1
))
> 0
⇐⇒ n <
(
b− 1
b
) b−1
2
n
∂MC
∂δ
= −
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)2
W
IW
−dq1
q1
−
1
δ (1 + δ)
(
(1− α)
α(1 + δ)
W
IW
δ
q2
) 1
b−1 [ n
ab
] 1
b−1
< 0
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